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On June 12, 2002, we organized a working session de-
voted to the topic of security in wireless ad hoc networks.
This event took place on our campus the day after MobiHoc
2002 and attracted around twenty persons in an informal
setting.
Securing wireless ad hoc networks is particularly diffi-
cult for many reasons including the following:
• Vulnerability of channels. As in any wireless network,
messages can be eavesdropped and fake messages can
be injected into the network without the difficulty of
having physical access to network components.
• Vulnerability of nodes. Since the network nodes usu-
ally do not reside in physically protected places, such
as locked rooms, they can more easily be captured and
fall under the control of an attacker.
• Absence of infrastructure. Ad hoc networks are sup-
posed to operate independently of any fixed infrastruc-
ture. This makes the classical security solutions based
on certification authorities and on-line servers inappli-
cable.
• Dynamically changing topology. In mobile ad hoc
networks, the permanent changes of topology require
sophisticated routing protocols, the security of which
is an additional challenge. A particular difficulty is
that incorrect routing information can be generated by
compromised nodes or as a result of some topology
changes, and it is hard to distinguish between the two
cases.
Clearly the problem is so broad that there is no way to
devise a general solution. It is also clear that different ap-
plications will have different security requirements. The
complexity and diversity of the field has led to a multitude
of proposals, which focus on different parts of the problem
domain. The presentations of the working session reflected
this complexity and diversity.
The working session was started with a brief overview
given by J.-P. Hubaux on the different aspects of security
in wireless ad hoc networks. The remaining presentations
were organized into the following four sessions:
• Trust and key management. Many security objectives
can be achieved by using cryptographic mechanisms.
Cryptographic mechanisms, in turn, rely on the proper
management of cryptographic keys. The presentations
by L. Zhou, S. Lu, and S. ˇCapkun were strongly re-
lated to this problem, and in particular, to certificate
based public-key distribution in mobile ad hoc net-
works. The talk given by G. Tsudik addressed the
broader issue of membership management in dynamic
peer groups, and went beyond the problems of group
key management.
• Secure routing and intrusion detection. Existing ad
hoc routing protocols, such as DSR and AODV, are
vulnerable to many kinds of attacks. It is fairly easy to
inject fake routing messages or modify legitimate ones
such that the operation of the network would be heav-
ily disturbed (e.g., by creating loops or disconnecting
the network). The talks given by Z. Haas, A. Perrig,
Y.-C. Hu, and E. Belding-Royer addressed this prob-
lem by proposing secure ad hoc routing protocols that
are resistant to various kinds of attacks. In his pre-
sentation, C. Castelluccia suggested the use of crypto
based identifiers for securing ad hoc routing protocols.
Finally, the talk by Y. Zhang focused on the problem
of intrusion detection in ad hoc networks.
• Availability. This session was concerned with the
problem of service unavailability due to either inten-
tional denial of service attacks or selfishness of the
nodes. Selfishness is a new problem that arises specif-
ically in the context of ad hoc networks where the
nodes belong to multiple administrative domains. In
these networks, nodes may tend to deny providing ser-
vices for the benefit of other nodes in order to save
their own resources (e.g., battery power). The presen-
tation by N. Vaidya discussed the problem of greedi-
ness (a form of selfishness) at the MAC layer, while
R. Molva, S. Buchegger, and L. Buttya´n addressed
selfishness in the context of packet forwarding.
• Cryptographic protocols. Traditional solutions for
key management can be unsuitable for ad hoc net-
works; likewise, existing solutions for other, higher
level security services, may also have to be reconsid-
ered. An example is fair exchange, which is known
to be impossible without a trusted third party, hence,
its implementation can be problematic in an infras-
tructureless ad hoc network. The presentations by
S. Vaudenay and L. Buttya´n addressed this problem
by proposing concepts that provide weaker guarantees
than true fairness but can be implemented in ad hoc
networks.
What follows is a set of extended abstracts of the pre-
sentations. The abstracts have been written by the par-
ticipants themselves; we only collected them together and
did some editorial work. We would like to thank all of
the participants for their contribution. We are also grateful
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to the Swiss National Competence Center in Research on
Mobile Information and Communication Systems (NCCR-
MICS)1, also known as the Terminodes Project2, for spon-
soring the working session. Finally, many thanks to Claude
Castelluccia who suggested to publish this report in MC2R.
Trust and key management
Distributed Trust in Ad Hoc Networks, Lidong Zhou
(Microsoft Research, Mountain View CA)
We propose a security paradigm centering around the no-
tion of distributed trust for ad hoc networks. Distributed
trust enhances security by composing otherwise untrust-
worthy individual entities into a trustworthy aggregation,
one that remains available and correct even if some of its
entities fail or become compromised. The challenge of
constructing such a trustworthy aggregation lies not only
in how to create and configure the aggregation, but also
in how the aggregation maintains its security by adapting
to changes in the network topology and the environment,
as well as to compromises of the individual entities. We
demonstrate how we apply distributed trust to building se-
cure services and to secure routing.
Distributed Secure Services: For a security-sensitive ser-
vice, such as a certification authority, distributed trust ad-
vocates providing the service through a set of nodes as
servers, so that the service remains available and correct
even if a small number of servers become compromised.
Fault tolerance mechanisms, such as the replicated state-
machine approach and quorum systems, have proven effec-
tive against server failures. However, replication of a secret
on servers increases the chance of disclosure because com-
promise of any server exposes the secret. The solution here
is secret sharing. A secret sharing scheme allows servers
to store shares of a secret, so that the secret can be recov-
ered if and only if enough shares are obtained from servers.
Threshold cryptography can be used for servers to perform
signing and decryption when the secret is a private key.
Secret sharing alone does not defend against mobile
adversaries, which attack, compromise, and control one
server for a limited period before moving to the next. Over
time, a mobile adversary could compromise enough servers
and recover the secret. Share refreshing, where servers cre-
ate a new, independent set of shares and replace old shares
with the new ones, provides a defense to mobile adver-
saries. Because new shares cannot be combined with old
ones to recover the secret, a mobile adversary must com-
promise enough servers between two consecutive execu-
tions of share refreshing. Share refreshing can be gener-
alized for the new shares to be re-distributed to a different
set of servers with a possibly different configuration. Such
generalization allows a service to adapt itself when certain
servers are permanently compromised or when the service
encounters a more malicious environment.
The feasibility of building such a secure distributed ser-
vice has been demonstrated for networks such as the Inter-
1NCCR-MICS is supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation
under grant number 5005-67322.
2http://www.terminodes.org/
net. The obstacles to deploying such a service on an ad hoc
network come not only from the scarcity of both compu-
tation and communication resources in an ad hoc network,
but also from the lack of secure network infrastructure. The
latter problem is addressed by secure routing.
Secure Routing: Secure routing is concerned with main-
taining connectivity in an ad hoc network despite com-
promised nodes disrupting route discovery and message
transmission. Following the philosophy of distributed
trust, multiple (ideally disjoint) paths between two nodes
should be discovered and maintained so that a small num-
ber of compromised nodes cannot disrupt all the paths.
We believe route discovery should be coupled with mes-
sage transmission, because, otherwise, even with a secure
route discovery protocol that prevents compromised nodes
from cheating, a compromised node could cooperate dur-
ing route discovery, but misbehave during message trans-
mission if the node happens to be on the discovered path.
We thus propose a probabilistic secure routing scheme,
where a node maintains, for each possible destination, a
probability distribution over all its neighbors. The proba-
bility associated with a neighbor reflects the relative likeli-
hood of that neighbor forwarding and eventually delivering
a message to the destination. Every message is routed prob-
abilistically at each hop based on the probability distribu-
tion for the destination. Multiple paths are thus implicitly
maintained through the probability distributions. Message
transmission itself provides the feedback for nodes to ad-
just the probability distributions. For example, an acknowl-
edgment, whose integrity is cryptographically protected
(e.g., by a digital signature), of the receipt of a message
provides a positive feedback for the path through which the
message traversed. Consequently, the set of multiple paths
maintained by the routing scheme for any two nodes adapts
itself as the probability distributions change.
Although probabilistic routing schemes have been stud-
ied in swarm intelligence, the application to secure rout-
ing raises various new issues, such as how to ensure the
integrity of feedbacks in face of compromised nodes with-
out excessive costs. Both analysis of and experiments with
such schemes are also needed to establish their practicality.
An extensive survey on swarm intelligence can be found
in [3]. Other related references can be found in the bibliog-
raphy of [37, 38].
Acknowledgments: This paper is in part based on joint
work with Fred B. Schneider, Robbert van Renesse, and
Zygmunt J. Haas, and benefited from discussions with
Michael Marsh, Panagiotis Papadimitratos, and Martin
Roth.
Network Performance Centric Security Design in
MANET, Hao Yang (UCLA), Gary Zhong (UCLA), and
Songwu Lu (UCLA)
“In theory there is no difference between theory
and practice. In practice there is...”
–Bruce Schneier in Secrets and Lies [33]
Security is a basic requirement for mobile ad hoc networks.
Several recent papers [37, 16, 19] have started to address
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security issues in such networks. While these early pro-
posals each have their own merit, they mainly focus on the
security vigor of the design and leave the network perfor-
mance aspect largely unaddressed. As a result, these so-
lutions may be extremely secure from the cryptographic
standpoint, but their real performance when deployed in
the network is unclear. This concern is further aggravated
by the unique characteristics of ad hoc networks, such
as highly dynamic network topology, frequent node ar-
rival/departure, and bandwidth-constrained wireless links.
In this work, we shift our main attention from the
cryptography-centric design approach to a more network-
centric design scheme, and focus on the practical network
performance aspect of the security design. Our goal is
to develop network performance-centric security solutions
that effectively balance security strength and network per-
formance in practice.
We focus on node authentication, the basic component in
a security solution. At the first stage, we investigate several
design choices – centralized, peer-to-peer, and localized
authentication schemes, and examine their network perfor-
mance by extensive simulations. The centralized scheme
[37] is similar to the TTP (Trusted Third Party) authen-
tication widely used in the wired networks, in which au-
thentication is done via the third-party certificate authority
(CA). The peer-to-peer authentication scheme [16] bears
the same philosophy as PGP, where authentication is done
through a chain of trust relationship that forms the “web of
trust”. The localized scheme [19] is specially designed for
ad hoc networks, in which each node is authenticated and
monitored by its multiple local neighboring nodes.
The simulation results are summarized in Table 1.
Scalability: We examine whether the design scales to the
number of nodes. The average node speed is 10 m/s, and
there is no channel error and other ongoing traffic (bench-
mark setting). When the number of nodes increases from
40 to 100, the success ratio of the authentication request
in centralized scheme drops from 92% to 22%; the success
ratio in peer-to-peer scheme remains stable around 88%;
while the success ratio in localized scheme remains stable
around 96%.
Availability: We increase the network traffic load and ex-
amine whether the design provides “anytime, anywhere”
security service to the mobile hosts. For a 60-node set-
ting with average speed of 10m/s, when the network traf-
fic load increases from 0 to 100 pkt/s (packet size 512B),
the success ratio in centralized schemes drops from 80%
to 45%; the success ratio in peer-to-peer scheme almost
remains stable around 85%; while the success ratio in lo-
calized scheme remains stable around 95%.
Robustness: We examine the robustness feature for differ-
ent channel conditions. For the same 60-node setting, when
the channel error rate increases from 0 to 10%, the suc-
cess ratio in centralized scheme drops from 80% to 50%;
the success ratio in peer-to-peer scheme drops from 85%
to 82%; while the success ratio in localized scheme drops
from 95% to 93%.
The fundamental reason for the performance difference
is the traffic pattern in these schemes. The localized scheme
has the best network performance in that the traffic is not
only distributed in the network, but also confined in the lo-
cal neighborhood. As a result, the impact of network scale,
traffic load, channel error, mobility, etc., on the localized
authentication service is very small in most scenarios.
The current study provides two guidelines for future se-
curity design in ad hoc networks: 1) the network perfor-
mance aspect should be explicitly considered in the design;
2) in order to have good network performance, it is desir-
able for the security solution to have localized traffic pat-
tern. Our next-stage effort focuses on devising new net-
work mechanisms to improve the performance of the secu-
rity design.
Scheme Centralized Peer-to-Peer Localized
Scalability Bad Good Good
Availability Bad Uncertain Good
Robustness Bad Uncertain Good
Communication Centralized Distributed Localized
Computation Undertaken solely Shared by Shared by
by the servers the nodes the nodes
Table 1: Network Performance Comparison of Three Au-
thentication Schemes (Network Performance Centric Secu-
rity Design in MANET, H. Yang, G. Zhong, and S. Lu)
Self-Organized Public Key Management for Mobile
Ad Hoc Networks, Srdjan ˇCapkun (EPFL), Levente
Buttya´n (EPFL), and Jean-Pierre Hubaux (EPFL)
By definition, mobile ad hoc networks do not rely on any
fixed infrastructure; instead, all networking functions (e.g.,
routing, mobility management, etc.) are performed by the
nodes themselves in a self-organizing manner. In secu-
rity terms, we consider an ad hoc network to be fully self-
organized, meaning that there is no infrastructure (hence
no PKI), no central authority, no centralized trusted third
party, no central server, no secret share dealer, even in the
initialization phase.
In [16], we propose a self-organizing public-key man-
agement system for fully self-organized mobile ad hoc net-
works. Our approach is similar to PGP in the sense that
users issue certificates for each other based on their per-
sonal acquaintances. However, in the proposed system,
certificates are stored and distributed by the users them-
selves, unlike in PGP, where this task is performed by on-
line servers (called certificate directories). In the proposed
self-organizing public-key management system, each user
maintains a local certificate repository. When two users
want to verify the public keys of each other, they merge
their local certificate repositories and try to find appropriate
certificate chains within the merged repository that make
the verification possible.
The success of this approach very much depends on the
construction of the local certificate repositories and on the
characteristics of the certificate graphs. By a certificate
graph, we mean a graph whose vertices represent public-
keys of the users and the edges represent public-key certifi-
cates issued by the users. In the same article, we propose
several repository construction algorithms and study their
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performance. The proposed algorithms take into account
the characteristics of the certificate graphs in a sense that
the choice of the certificates that are stored by each user
depends on the connectivity of the user and her certificate
graph neighbors. More precisely, each user stores in her lo-
cal repository several directed and mutually disjoint paths
of certificates. Each path begins at the user herself, and
each certificate on the path is chosen from the set of cer-
tificates that are connected to the last selected user on the
path in such a way that the chosen certificate leads to a
user that has the highest number of certificates connected
to her (i.e., the highest vertex degree). We call this algo-
rithm the Maximum Degree Algorithm, as the local repos-
itory construction criterion is the degree of the vertices in
the certificate graph. In a second, more sophisticated al-
gorithm, certificates are selected into the local repositories
based on the number of the shortcut certificates connected
to the users. Here, a shortcut certificate is defined as a cer-
tificate such that when it is removed from the graph, the
shortest path between the two users previously connected
by this certificate becomes strictly larger than two. We call
this algorithm the Shortcut Hunter Algorithm.
The analysis of these two algorithms shows that even
a simple construction algorithm can achieve high perfor-
mance in the sense that any user u can find at least one cer-
tificate chain to any other user v in the merged repository
of u and v with very high probability even if the size of the
local repositories is small (in the order of √n) compared
to the total number n of users in the system. We simu-
lated the effectiveness of the two proposed algorithms on
the PGP certificate graph, as this graph is the only known
example of a self-organized certificate graph creation. The
results show that even with a certificate repository size of
less than
√
n, two users have a high (90%) chance of find-
ing an appropriate chain of certificates between them in
their merged repositories. Our results further show that the
average length of the certificate chains in the merged local
repositories of the users is ≈ 8, while in the whole PGP
certificate graph it is ≈ 6. This is due to the characteris-
tics of the PGP certificate graph, which exhibits the small-
world phenomenon [8]. More precisely, in PGP certificate
graphs, the average shortest path length between two ver-
tices is small (compared to the graph size) and it scales
logarithmically with the graph size.
As any approach that uses certificate chains, this ap-
proach assumes that trust is transitive (which is often not
the case in practice). In order to alleviate this problem, we
propose to look for multiple certificate paths and to use au-
thentication metrics.
The main idea of the proposed approach is summarized
on Figure 1. The public keys of the users are represented by
certificate graph vertices, while the graph edges represent
public-key certificates issued by the owners of the public
keys. The figure shows the local certificate repositories of
users u and v and the chains of certificates that u uses to
authenticate the public key Kv of v.
Admission Control in Collaborative Groups, Yongdae
Kim (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis), Daniele Maz-
zocchi (Torino Polytechnic), and Gene Tsudik (UC Irvine)
KvKu
local certificate repository of u
local certificate repository of v
path from K tou Kv
Figure 1: Paths from Ku to Kv in the merged local reposi-
tories of u and v (Self-Organized Public Key Management
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, S. ˇCapkun, L. Buttya´n, and
J.-P. Hubaux)
The current proliferation of group-oriented applications,
protocols and services triggers the need for special-
ized group security services and mechanisms. Exam-
ples of popular group-oriented settings include: IP tele-
phony, video/audio conferencing, file sharing, collabora-
tive workspaces, and multi-user games. Group settings are
clearly very diverse. Some, such as conferencing, require
synchronous operation while others, such as file sharing,
operate in a disconnected, asynchronous manner. Com-
munication models vary as well: from the one-to-many or
few-to-many (e.g., GPS) to any-to-any peer groups (e.g.,
Gnutella).
The need for, and the importance of, group security
mechanisms has been recognized by the research commu-
nity as supported by popularity of this topic. However, the
bulk of prior work has been done in the context of large
multicast-style groups where it is natural to assume or im-
pose a centralized authority (the sender or an on-line trusted
third party) that can perform security chores, e.g., key man-
agement, admission/access control and member authenti-
cation. Such an authority may be group-specific or group-
independent and its existence makes it relatively easy to im-
plement security policies and mechanisms. However, due
to peer nature, some other group settings exhibit unique
properties and requirements.
Our research is focused on admission control mecha-
nisms for peer groups. A peer group is characterized by
a flat non-hierarchical) structure where all members have
identical rights and duties. In other words, there is no un-
derlying assumption of a centralized authority that provides
security services such as access control or key manage-
ment. Also, a peer group often involves any-to-any com-
munication: any member can send data to any other mem-
ber(s). Security in peer groups presents a formidable chal-
lenge. Lack of centralized authority entails the involvement
of all group members in tasks, such as key management. As
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evidenced by prior work in peer group key management, it
is very hard to design multi-party, multi-round protocols
that are, at the same time, secure, efficient and robust.
Although an important issue, peer group admission con-
trol has been somehow overlooked in the past. With the
exception of Antigone, most prior work in peer group se-
curity has focused on key management and authentica-
tion, whereas, without admission control, key management
alone is all but useless. Consequently, our initial goal is to
develop a framework for peer group admission control as
well as investigate cryptographic mechanisms suitable for
different peer group flavors.
This short (1-page) abstract is clearly insufficient to pro-
vide the technical description of our work. We refer the
reader to the full paper3 for details. However, as a brief
overview, the highlights of the full paper are as follows:
• We begin by motivating the need for a so-called Group
Charter, a certified statement stipulating the group ad-
mission criteria (policy or rules).
• We then argue that an authoritative entity (referred to
as the Group Authority) must be defined (and reflected
in the Group Charter) in order to actually perform the
admission. This entity may be off- or on-line and may
or may not be distributed. In one extreme case, it is
composed of all group members collectively.
• Next, several important dimensions in peer group ad-
mission control are considered: Membership Dynam-
ics, Membership Awareness, Members’ On-Line Pres-
ence, Group Lifetime. Related to these are the char-
acteristics of the Group Authority, in particular, its
placement (in or out of the group) and its composition
(single or distributed)
• Then, we introduce and discuss three models for peer
group admission control: 1) admission via public
ACL, 2) admission by Group Authority, and 3) admis-
sion by the members themselves (here we also con-
sider the case of the group acting as its own Group
Authority)
• Concentrating on the last (and the most challenging)
model, we look into different flavors of voting suitable
for the admission.
• Lastly, we attempt to sorting out a number of signa-
ture schemes applicable for the voting process. These
include: 1) plain digital signatures, 2) threshold sig-
natures (both fixed and dynamic), 3) accountable sub-
group multi-signatures and 4) group signatures.
To conclude, we motivate the importance of admission
control in dynamic peer groups. This work represents
an initial attempt to develop an admission control frame-
work suitable for different flavors of peer groups and match
them with appropriate cryptographic techniques. We exam-
ine various dimensions of admission control, discuss sev-
eral cryptographic techniques and assess their applicability.
Clearly, much remains to be done...
3http://sconce.ics.uci.edu/admctl
Secure routing and intrusion detec-
tion
Secure Routing for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks4, Pana-
giotis Papadimitratos (Cornell University) and Zygmunt
J. Haas (Cornell University)
For such self-organizing infrastructures as mobile ad hoc
networks , envisioned to operate in an open, collabora-
tive, and highly volatile environment, the importance of
security cannot be underrated. The provision of compre-
hensive secure communication mandates that both route
discovery and data forwarding be safeguarded. The dis-
cussed here Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [25] counters
malicious behavior that targets the discovery of topologi-
cal information. The protection of the data transmission is
a separate problem: an intermittently misbehaving attacker
could first comply with the route discovery to make itself
part of a route, and then corrupt the in-transit data. Protec-
tion of data transmission is addressed through our related
Secure Message Transmission Protocol (SMT), which pro-
vides a flexible, end-to-end secure data forwarding scheme
that naturally complement SRP. Here we discuss the design
of SRP only, while SMT is the subject of another publica-
tion.
SRP provides correct routing information; i.e., factual,
up-to-date, and authentic connectivity information regard-
ing a pair of nodes that wish to communicate in a secure
manner. The sole requirement is that any two such end
nodes have a security association. Accordingly, SRP does
not require that any of the intermediate nodes perform
cryptographic operations or have a prior association with
the end nodes. As a result, its end-to-end operation allows
for efficient cryptographic mechanisms, such as message
authentication codes. More importantly, SRP can be used
in wide range of networks, without restrictive assumptions
on the underlying trust, network size, and membership.
SRP discovers one or more routes whose correctness can
be verified from the route “geometry” itself. Route re-
quests propagate verifiably to the sought, trusted destina-
tion. Route replies are returned strictly over the reversed
route, as accumulated in the route request packet. In or-
der to guarantee this crucially important functionality, the
interaction of the protocol with the IP-related functional-
ity is explicitly defined. An intact reply implies that (i)
the reported path is the one placed in the reply packet by
the destination, and (ii) the corresponding connectivity in-
formation is correct, since the reply was relayed along the
reverse of the discovered route.
The securing of the route discovery deprives the adver-
sarial nodes of an “effective” means to systematically dis-
rupt the communications of their peers. Despite our min-
imal trust assumptions, attackers cannot impersonate the
destination and redirect data traffic, cannot respond with
stale or corrupted routing information, are prevented from
broadcasting forged control packets to obstruct the later
propagation of legitimate queries, and are unable to influ-
ence the topological knowledge of benign nodes. To that
4This work has been sponsored in part by the NSF grant number ANI-
9980521 and the ONR contract number N00014-00-1-0564.
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extent, SRP provides very strong assurances on the correct-
ness of the link-level connectivity information as well. It
precludes adversarial nodes from forming “dumb” relays,
and from controlling multiple potential routes per source-
destination pair. However, with the adversary within the
transmission range of the destination the last two defenses
are somewhat weakened. Additionally, two colluding ad-
versaries might be able to “tunnel” the query and the cor-
responding reply packets to each other within a single
query/response phase. Then, the validated route would pro-
vide partially correct link information only. However, this
vulnerability is not specific to SRP: such information could
not be distinguished from the actual link connectivity, even
under the assumption of a fully trusted network.
Furthermore, it is important to estimate the cost of intro-
ducing security features, such as computational and trans-
mission overhead, increased traffic and delays, etc. On the
one hand, security countermeasures should not undermine
the efficiency of the network protocols; e.g., the ability of
nodes to quickly respond to topological changes and dis-
cover correct routes. On the other hand, it necessary to
ensure the effectiveness of the security provision; i.e., that
the route discovery retains its ability to operate when un-
der attack. Finally, the solution should be applicable to a
wide range of network instances, especially when nodes
have limited computational and communication resources.
Through a systematic performance evaluation, our results
show that, over a range of scenarios, SRP is successful in
providing correct routing information in a timely manner.
Also, it can do so even in the presence of a significant frac-
tion of adversaries that disrupt the route discovery. More-
over, we observe that the processing overhead due to cryp-
tographic operations remains low, allowing the protocol to
remain competitive to reactive protocols, which do not in-
corporate security features at all.
As future work, we intend to investigate complex attacks
against SRP and classify them with respect to their impact
on the protocol performance. Through combining of SMT
with SRP, the detrimental effects on performance of such
attacks, in particular, those of intermittently misbehaving
nodes, can be alleviated.
Packet Leashes: A Defense against Wormhole Attacks
in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, Yih-Chun Hu (Rice Uni-
versity), Adrian Perrig (UC Berkeley), David B. Johnson
(Rice University)
We describe the wormhole attack [14], a severe attack
against ad hoc routing protocols that is particularly chal-
lenging to defend against. We show how an attacker can
use the wormhole attack to cripple a range of ad hoc net-
work routing protocols. In the wormhole attack, an attacker
records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tun-
nels them to another location, and retransmits them there
into the network. Most existing ad hoc network routing
protocols, without some mechanism to defend them against
the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer
than one or two hops, severely disrupting communication.
If a wormhole attacker tunnels all packets through the
wormhole honestly and reliably, no harm is done; the
attacker actually provides a useful service in connecting
the network more efficiently. However, when an attacker
forwards only routing control messages, routing may be
severely disrupted. For example, when used against an on-
demand routing protocol such as DSR [17] or AODV [29],
a powerful application of the wormhole attack can be
mounted by tunneling each ROUTE REQUEST packet di-
rectly to the destination target node of the REQUEST. This
attack prevents routes more than two hops long from be-
ing discovered. Periodic protocols are also vulnerable to
the same attack. For example, OLSR [31] and TBRPF [1]
use HELLO packets for neighbor detection, so if an attacker
tunnels to B all HELLO packets transmitted by A, and tun-
nels to A all HELLO packets transmitted by B, then A and
B will believe that they are neighbors, which would cause
the routing protocol to fail to find routes when they are not
actually neighbors. The wormhole attack is also dangerous
in other wireless applications. One example is any wire-
less access control system that is proximity based, such as
wireless car keys, or proximity and token based access con-
trol systems for PCs [11, 18]. In such systems, an attacker
could relay the authentication exchanges to gain unautho-
rized access.
Our solution to the wormhole attack is packet leashes.
We consider specifically two types of packet leashes: geo-
graphical leashes and temporal leashes. The key intuition
is that by authenticating either an extremely precise times-
tamp or location information combined with a loose times-
tamp, a receiver can determine if the packet has traversed a
distance that is unrealistic for the specific network technol-
ogy used.
Temporal Leashes: Temporal leashes rely on extremely
precise time synchronization and extremely precise times-
tamps in each packet. The travel time of a packet can be
approximated as the difference between the receive time
and the timestamp. To be more conservative, however, a
node may choose to add the maximum time synchroniza-
tion error, on the assumption that the sender’s clock may
be faster than the receiver’s. Conversely, to allow all di-
rect communication between legitimate nodes, a node may
subtract the maximum time synchronization error, on the
assumption that the sender’s clock may be slower than the
receiver’s.
Given the precise time synchronization required by tem-
poral leashes, we constructed some very efficient broad-
cast authenticators based entirely on symmetric primitives.
In particular, we extend the TESLA broadcast authentica-
tion protocol [30] to allow the disclosure of the authentica-
tion key within the packet that is authenticated. We use a
Merkle tree [22] to authenticate these keys.
We demonstrated the suitability of temporal leashes with
our authentication mechanism by measuring computational
power and memory currently available in mobile devices.
Current commodity wireless LAN products such as com-
monly used 802.11b cards provide 11 Mbps at 250 meters.
With time synchronization provided by a Trimble Thun-
derbolt GPS-Disciplined Clock [34], the synchronization
error can be as low as 183 ns with probability 1−10−10.
We also assume authentic keys are re-established every day,
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with a 20 byte minimum packet size and an 80-bit message
authentication code length. Our scheme requires just 2.6
megabytes of storage and requires a maximum of 39,500
hash functions per second (assuming packets are arriving at
link speed), which is well within the capability of an iPaq,
with 82.2% of its CPU time to spare.
Geographical Leashes: Another method to construct a
leash is to use location information and loosely synchro-
nized clocks. If the clocks of the sender and receiver
are synchronized to within ±∆, and ν is an upper bound
on the velocity of any node, then the receiver can com-
pute an upper bound on the distance between the sender
and itself dsr. Specifically, based on the timestamp ts in
the packet, the local receive time tr, the maximum rela-
tive error in location information δ, and the locations of
the receiver pr and the sender ps, dsr can be bounded by
dsr ≤ ||ps − pr||+ 2ν · (tr − ts +∆) + δ.
In certain circumstances, bounding the distance between
the sender and receiver dsr cannot prevent wormhole at-
tacks; for example, when obstacles prevent communication
between two nodes that would otherwise be in transmission
range, a distance-based scheme would still allow worm-
holes between the sender and receiver. A network that uses
location information as a leash can control even these kinds
of wormholes. To accomplish this, each node has a radio
propagation model. A receiver verifies that every possi-
ble location of the sender (a δ + ν(tr − ts + 2∆) radius
around ps) can reach every possible location of the receiver
(a δ + ν(tr − ts + 2∆) radius around pr).
Summary: Packet leashes restrict an attacker’s ability to
tunnel a packet between two legitimate nodes. If deployed
in a very conservative way, it may also restrict legitimate
communications between two legitimate nodes, but more
severely restrict tunnels. Conversely, less conservative set-
tings allow more legitimate communications, but also pro-
vide an attacker with greater flexibility.
Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing in Mobile
Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, Yih-Chun Hu (Rice Univer-
sity), David B. Johnson (Rice University), Adrian Perrig
(UC Berkeley)
We describe our protocol, which we call the Se-
cure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol
(SEAD) [13]. SEAD is robust against multiple uncoordi-
nated attackers creating incorrect routing state in any other
node, even in spite of active attackers or compromised
nodes in the network. We base the design of SEAD in part
on the Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector ad hoc net-
work routing protocol (DSDV) [28]. In order to support
use of SEAD with nodes of limited CPU processing ca-
pability, and to guard against Denial-of-Service attacks in
which an attacker attempts to cause other nodes to consume
excess network bandwidth or processing time, we use effi-
cient one-way hash functions and do not use asymmetric
cryptographic operations in the protocol.
Distance Vector Routing: In distance vector routing, each
router maintains a routing table listing all possible destina-
tions within the network. Each entry in a node’s routing ta-
ble contains the address (identity) of some destination, this
node’s shortest known distance (usually in number of hops)
to that destination, and the address of this node’s neighbor
router that is the first hop on this shortest route to that desti-
nation; the distance to the destination is known as the met-
ric in that table entry. Each router forwarding a packet uses
its own routing table to determine the next hop towards the
destination.
To maintain the routing tables, each node periodically
broadcasts routing update containing the information from
its own routing table. Each node updates its own table using
the updates it hears, so that its route for each destination
uses as a next hop the neighbor that advertised the smallest
metric in its update for that destination; the node sets the
metric in its table entry for that destination to 1 (hop) more
than the metric in that neighbor’s update.
The primary improvement for ad hoc networks made in
DSDV over standard distance vector routing is the addi-
tion of a sequence number in each routing table entry. The
use of this sequence number prevents routing loops caused
by updates being applied out of order; this problem may
be common over multihop wireless transmission, since the
routing information may spread along many different paths
through the network.
Hash Chains: A one-way hash chain is built on a one-way
hash function. Like a normal hash function, a one-way hash
function, H , maps an input of any length to a fixed-length
bit string. Thus, H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ρ, where ρ is the
length in bits of the output of the hash function. The func-
tion H should be simple to compute yet must be computa-
tionally infeasible in general to invert.
To create a one-way hash chain, a node chooses a ran-
dom x ∈ {0, 1}ρ and computes the list of values
h0, h1, h2, h3, . . . , hn
where h0 = x, and hi = H(hi−1) for 0 < i ≤ n, for some
n. The node at initialization generates the elements of its
hash chain as shown above, from “left to right” (in order
of increasing subscript i) and then over time uses certain
elements of the chain to secure its routing updates; in using
these values, the node progresses from “right to left” (in
order of decreasing subscript i) within the generated chain.
Given an existing authenticated element of a one-way
hash chain, it is possible to verify elements later in the se-
quence of use within the chain (further to the “left,” or in or-
der of decreasing subscript). For example, given an authen-
ticated hi value, a node can authenticate hi−3 by comput-
ing H(H(H(hi−3))) and verifying that the resulting value
equals hi. To use one-way hash chains for authentication,
we assume some mechanism for a node to distribute an au-
thentic element such as hn from its generated hash chain.
Authenticating Routing Updates: Each node in SEAD uses
a specific single next element from its hash chain in each
routing update that it sends about itself (metric 0). Based on
this initial element, the one-way hash chain conceptually
provides authentication for the lower bound of the metric
in other routing updates for this destination; the authenti-
cation provides only a lower bound on the metric: An at-
tacker can increase the metric, claim the same metric, but
cannot decrease the metric.
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We assume that an upper bound can be placed on the di-
ameter of the ad hoc network, and we use m− 1 to denote
this bound. The method used by SEAD for authenticating
an entry in a routing update uses the sequence number in
that entry to determine a contiguous group of m elements
from that destination node’s hash chain, one element of
which must be used to authenticate that routing update. The
particular element from this group of elements that must be
used to authenticate the entry is determined by the metric
value being sent in that entry. Specifically, if a node’s hash
chain is the sequence of values
h0, h1, h2, h3, . . . , hn
and n is divisible by m, then for a sequence number i in
some routing update entry, let k = nm − i. An element
from the group of elements
hkm, hkm+1, . . . , hkm+m−1
from this hash chain is used to authenticate the entry; if
the metric value for this entry is j, 0 ≤ j < m, then
the value hkm+j here is used to authenticate the routing
update entry for that sequence number. Nodes receiving
any routing update can easily authenticate each entry in the
update, given any earlier authentic hash element from the
same hash chain.
Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for
Ad Hoc Networks, Yih-Chun Hu (Rice University), Adrian
Perrig (UC Berkeley), David B. Johnson (Rice University)
We describe some features of Ariadne [15], a secure on-
demand routing protocol that withstands node compromise
and relies only on highly efficient symmetric cryptography.
Ariadne can authenticate routing messages using one of
three schemes: shared secrets between each pair of nodes,
shared secrets between communicating nodes combined
with broadcast authentication, or digital signatures. We pri-
marily discuss here the use of Ariadne with TESLA [30],
an efficient broadcast authentication scheme that requires
loose time synchronization. Using pairwise shared keys
avoids the need for synchronization, but at the cost of
higher key setup overhead.
Basic Ariadne Route Discovery: We present the design of
the Ariadne protocol in two stages: we first present a mech-
anism that enables the target to verify the authenticity of
the ROUTE REQUEST; we then present an efficient per-hop
hashing technique to verify that no node is missing from
the node list in the REQUEST. In the following discussion
we assume that the initiator S performs a Route Discov-
ery for target D, and that they share the secret keys KSD
and KDS , respectively, for message authentication in each
direction.
Target authenticates ROUTE REQUESTs. To convince
the target of the legitimacy of each field in a ROUTE RE-
QUEST, the initiator simply includes a MAC computed with
key KSD over unique data, for example a timestamp. The
target can easily verify the authenticity and freshness of the
route request using the shared key KSD.
In a Route Discovery, the initiator wants to authenticate
each individual node in the node list of the ROUTE REPLY.
A secondary requirement is that the target can authenticate
each node in the node list of the ROUTE REQUEST, so that
it will return a ROUTE REPLY only along paths that con-
tain only legitimate nodes. Each hop authenticates new
information in the REQUEST. The target buffers the RE-
PLY until intermediate nodes can release the corresponding
TESLA keys. The TESLA security condition is verified at
the target, and the target includes a MAC in the REPLY to
certify that the security condition was met.
Per-hop hashing. Authentication of data in routing mes-
sages is not sufficient, as an attacker could remove a node
from the node list in a REQUEST. We use one-way hash
functions to verify that no hop was omitted, and we call
this approach per-hop hashing. To change or remove a pre-
vious hop, an attacker must either hear a REQUEST without
that node listed, or must be able to invert the one-way hash
function.
Basic Ariadne Route Maintenance: Route Maintenance in
Ariadne is based on DSR. A node forwarding a packet to
the next hop along the source route returns a ROUTE ER-
ROR to the original sender of the packet if it is unable to
deliver the packet to the next hop after a limited number of
retransmission attempts. In this section, we discuss mech-
anisms for securing ROUTE ERROR s, but we do not con-
sider the case of attackers not sending ERROR s.
To prevent unauthorized nodes from sending ERROR s,
we require that an ERROR be authenticated by the sender.
Each node on the return path to the source forwards the
ERROR. If the authentication is delayed, for example when
TESLA is used, each node that will be able to authenticate
the ERROR buffers it until it can be authenticated.
Avoiding Routing Misbehavior: The protocol described so
far is vulnerable to an attacker that happens to be along
the discovered route. In particular, we have not presented
a means of determining whether intermediate nodes are
in fact forwarding packets that they have been requested
to forward. We choose routes based on their prior per-
formance in packet delivery. Our scheme relies on feed-
back about which packets were successfully delivered. The
feedback can be received either through an extra end-to-
end network layer message, or by exploiting properties of
transport layers, such as TCP with SACK [21]; this feed-
back approach is somewhat similar that used in IPv6 for
Neighbor Unreachability Detection [24].
A node with multiple routes to a single destination can
assign a fraction of packets that it originates to be sent
along each route. When a substantially smaller fraction of
packets sent along any particular route are successfully de-
livered, the node can begin sending a smaller fraction of its
overall packets to that destination along that route.
Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks, Kimaya
Sanzgiri (UCSB), Bridget Dahill (UMass, Amherst), Brian
N. Levine (UMass, Amherst), Clay Shields (Georgetown
University, Washington DC), Elizabeth M. Belding-Royer
(UCSB)
Abstract: Most proposed routing protocols for mobile ad
hoc networks are vulnerable to modification, imperson-
ation and fabrication attacks. The proposed secure rout-
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ing protocol, Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks,
prevents such attacks through message authentication, in-
tegrity and non-repudiation. Simulation results show that
ARAN maintains good network performance while offer-
ing significant security advantages over existing routing
protocols.
Introduction: Mobile ad hoc networks consist purely of
wireless mobile nodes with no wired infrastructure. Com-
munication between nodes that are not within direct trans-
mission range of each other is enabled through packet for-
warding by intermediate nodes. The topology and mem-
bership of these networks is highly dynamic. Most of the
proposed routing protocols for ad hoc networks are opti-
mized for performance in such a dynamic environment.
However, many of these proposed routing protocols have
security vulnerabilities that may be exploited to launch dif-
ferent types of attacks.
In this analysis, three main categories of attacks are iden-
tified. The first of these are modification attacks, where ma-
licious nodes can make illegitimate modifications to rout-
ing messages. The second category is that of impersonation
or spoofing attacks, where a malicious node can fake its
identity by illegally modifying its IP and/or MAC address
in outgoing messages. Fabrication attacks form the third
category of attacks, where a malicious node could inject
false routing messages into the network. These techniques
can be used both individually and in various combinations
to cause illegal route redirection, route corruption and de-
nial of service.
The proposed protocol, Authenticated Routing for Ad-
hoc Networks (ARAN) [32], prevents the above types of
attacks through message authentication, integrity and non-
repudiation.
Protocol Description: The ARAN Protocol uses public
key cryptography to guarantee message authentication, in-
tegrity and non-repudiation. The protocol is designed for
the managed-open environment, where nodes can obtain a
public key certificate from a common certification author-
ity that is trusted by all other nodes in the environment.
Typical examples of such an environment are classroom or
conference scenarios. The operation of the protocol can be
divided into route discovery and route maintenance phases.
The route discovery process is initiated by the source
node by flooding a digitally signed Route Discovery packet
(RDP) to its neighbors:
S → broadcast : [RDP, IPD, certS , NS , t]KS− (1)
When a neighbor A receives the RDP message, it sets up a
reverse path back to the source node and verifies the signa-
ture of the source by extracting S’s public key from its cer-
tificate. The node then signs the contents of the message,
appends its own certificate, and broadcasts the message to
its neighbors. When A’s neighbor B receives the message,
it validates A’s signature, and then replaces it with its own
signature (the signature of the source node is retained). The
packet continues to be rebroadcast in this manner across the
network until it reaches the destination.
When the first RDP reaches the destination, the destina-
tion node verifies the signature of the source node and then
sends a digitally signed Route Reply packet (REP) back to
the source. The REP travels along the same path as the
RDP, and the same signing procedure is performed by in-
termediate nodes. Note that because the destination must
sign the REP message, only the destination is allowed to re-
spond to the RDP. Also, because RDP messages are signed
at each hop and do not contain a hop count or a source
route, malicious nodes have no opportunity to intentionally
redirect traffic.
Route maintenance is performed through digitally signed
Error messages that are initiated by the node directly up-
stream of a link failure.
Conclusion: ARAN provides both end-to-end and hop-by-
hop authentication of route discovery and reply messages,
preventing impersonation attacks. The digital signatures
guarantee integrity and non-repudiation, preventing ille-
gal message modification and enabling identification of the
source of erroneous messages.
Simulation results show that ARAN provides the same
throughput as leading ad hoc routing protocols with
marginally increased overhead and delay due to the digi-
tal signatures.
Dynamic and Secure Group Membership in Ad Hoc
and Peer-to-Peer Networks, Claude Castelluccia (INRIA
Rhoˆne-Alpes) and Gabriel Montenegro (Sun Labs, Europe)
Introduction: Ad hoc or peer-to-peer networks (called im-
promptu networks henceforth) pose many problems with
respect to securing their highly dynamic structures. A naive
approach assumes any given node can trust all other nodes
in the impromptu network for any type of operation (for
example, engaging in some cooperative and perhaps confi-
dential activity). This paper improves on previous efforts
to secure group authorization (including membership). We
do so by employing crypto-based identifiers [23] for node
and group identification, and then use these in authoriza-
tion certificates. These allow groups (or nodes) to authorize
nodes (or other groups) [10].
Our approach enables highly flexible and robust im-
promptu security services in an inherently distributed fash-
ion. Previous work on securing impromptu networks has
assumed the existence of a traditional PKI, of some web of
trust or of some mechanism to distribute keys and shared
secrets. We believe these assumptions are unrealistic in im-
promptu networks.
Secure Node Identity: First of all, we must start by defin-
ing an addressing model. Previous efforts for ad hoc net-
works conclude that since there is no aggregation to the de-
gree possible with regular fixed networks, addressing can
be more flexible. We propose to use pure identifiers with
no topological meaning.
Our scheme improves upon these by having an im-
plicit cryptographic binding between a node’s identifier and
its public key (or certificate). A node autoconfigures its
(crypto-based) identifier (CBID) by doing the following:
• Create a pair of public and private keys (PK and SK).
• Create its CBID: CBID = hash(PK).
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Note that the hash function can be applied over more
than just the public key (e.g., a salt or some other val-
ues) [23]. Given the secure correspondence between iden-
tity and public key, the latter can be communicated by the
node itself. This simplifies key management, since no third
parties need to be involved either in creating or distributing
the public keys.
Provided the bit-length of the CBID’s is large
enough [23], these identifiers have two very important
properties: (1) they are statistically unique, because of
the collision-resistance property of the cryptographic hash
function used to generate them, and (2) they are securely
bound to a given node: the node can prove ownership of
the CBID by signing packets with the corresponding pri-
vate key. Any other node can verify the signature without
relying on any centralized security service such as a PKI or
Key Distribution Center.
These characteristics (1) make CBID’s a very scalable
naming system, well adapted to ad hoc environments, and
(2) provide an autoconfigurable and solid foundation for
nodes to engage in verifiable exchanges with each other.
Dynamic and Secure Node Authentication: The first appli-
cation of the above is to protect basic exchanges between
two peers or nodes in a network from malicious intermedi-
ate hosts. For example, in on-demand ad hoc routing proto-
cols (e.g. [27, 26]), nodes discover each other by exchang-
ing “route request” and “route reply” messages. We have
recently shown how CBID can protect this basic exchange
from impersonation attacks [9]. Similar work is underway
for the JXTA5 open-source peer-to-peer protocol.
Dynamic and Secure Group Membership: Subsequently,
CBID’s are used to express authorization via authorization
certificates, similar to how they are used to Secure Group
Management for IPv6 [10].
Authorization certificates have the following form:
Cert = (group,node, delegation, tag , validity)
In the above, group is a group CBID for the entire im-
promptu network, or for a subset of it. Appropriately, the
certificate is signed with the private key that corresponds
to it. Here, node is the CBID of the beneficiary of this au-
thorization, that is, the node that is authorized by the group
to join it or perform certain services on its behalf. delega-
tion is a boolean (in either SPKI [12] or KeyNote2 [2]) that
specifies whether or not the group has allowed the node to
further delegate the permission expressed in the next field.
Finally, tag is the authorization to be a member of the sign-
ing group, or to perform certain services as authorized by
the group.
This is an example of how a single node A with CBID of
A CBID could start an ad hoc network (really a group
within a perhaps already physically existing ad hoc net-
work) by following these steps:
• A creates the group group public and private key pair:
G PK and G SK.
• A creates the group identifier: G CBID =
hash(G PK).
5http://www.jxta.org
• A as the group controller issues a certificate to al-
low itself into the group: (G CBID,A CBID, true,
“groupMembership′′, someDuration).
• A as the group controller admits another node
(e.g., B) into the group by issuing the corre-
sponding certificate: (G CBID,B CBID, false,
“groupMembership′′, someDuration).
Now, either A or B can prove to other nodes that they
are legitimate members of the group by sending a message
which includes their certificate, and that is signed with their
private key A SK or B SK, respectively.
Intrusion Detection, Yongguang Zhang (HRL Labs & UT
Austin) and Wenke Lee (GA Tech)
Intrusion prevention measures, such as encryption and au-
thentication, can be used in ad-hoc networks to reduce in-
trusions, but cannot eliminate them. For example, encryp-
tion and authentication cannot defend against compromised
mobile nodes, which often carry the private keys. Insider
attacks may also deem firewalls useless. The history of se-
curity research has taught us a valuable lesson – no matter
how many intrusion prevention measures are inserted in a
network, there are always some weak links that one could
exploit to break in. In a high-survivability network, Intru-
sion Detection System (IDS) is necessary as a second wall
of defense.
However, current IDS techniques are designed for wired
networks only; they are inadequate for mobile ad-hoc net-
works (MANET). For example, today’s network-based IDS
relies on real-time traffic analysis of traces collected at
switches, routers, or gateways. However, MANET en-
vironment does not have such traffic concentration point
where one can collect audit data for the entire network.
Instead, the only available audit trace is limited to com-
munication activities taking place within the radio range.
IDS is thus forced to work with this partial and localized
information. Furthermore, thanks to mobility MANET is
seemingly chaotic in nature, and this blends anomaly and
normalcy situations together. There is nothing parallel to
this in wired networks, and none of the current IDSes has
been tested in such a dynamic environment.
Therefore, there are unique issues for IDS in MANET:
• A fully distributed solution. IDS must work alone at
each node, but collaborative detection and investiga-
tion among neighboring nodes is possible.
• Localized and incomplete audit data. IDS algorithm
may be required to sense anomaly hops away.
• Thin line between anomaly and normalcy, which re-
quires an elaborated model to produce high detection
rate with low false alarm rate.
• Resource constrains. IDS should not consume too
much power as MANET environment is often oper-
ated on battery power.
Our goal is to develop IDS techniques that address these
issues. In our preliminary study [35], we have developed a
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new architecture called “Distributed and Cooperative Intru-
sion Detection.” In this model, IDS agent runs at each mo-
bile node and performs local data collection and local de-
tection, whereas cooperative detection and global intrusion
response can be triggered when a node reports anomaly.
We have also proposed an anomaly detection model for de-
tecting attacks on MANET routing protocols.
In a subsequent study [36], we have built such an IDS
model and implemented it in a network simulator (ns2 with
CMU’s MANET extension). We have also conducted a se-
ries of experiments to study its effectiveness. The exper-
iments are on a 10-node MANET network. The perfor-
mance evaluation is by measuring the detection rate and
false-alarm rate (see Figure 2). We simulate three differ-
ent types of intrusion conditions separately: route-attack
model where a node’s route table is randomly falsified,
traffic-attack model where a node randomly drops packets
that it is supposed to forward, and “no-attack” (i.e., under
normal use). In Figure 2, square, cylinder, and darker bars
represent each of these conditions respectively. We also
repeat the experiments with different MANET routing pro-
tocol (DSR, ADOV, or DSDV), and use two different types
of IDS model-training tools (RIPPER or SVM-Light).
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
detection rate (RIPPER) false alarm rate (RIPPER) detection rate (SVM Light) false alarm rate (SVM Light)
no attacks
route attacks
traffic attacks
DSR DSDVAODV
DSR DSDVAODV
DSR DSDVAODV
DSR DSDVAODV
Figure 2: IDS performance measurement (Intrusion Detec-
tion, Y. Zhang and W. Lee)
The result seems rather positive: under some configura-
tion (DSR + SVM-Light), our IDS model can detect 99%
of the intrusions with lower than 1% false-alarm rate. More
importantly, we do learn some useful lessons. First, there
is indeed a very thin line between normalcy and anomaly
in MANET. We had to try a large number of feature com-
binations and most of the earlier ones simply fell with low
detection rate and high false alarm rate. The good news is
that it is possible to find this line, like the final model we
used to generate this result.
Another observation is the disparity among routing
protocols. For example, on-demand protocols (DSR
and AODV) are likely to out-perform table-driven ones
(DSDV). This is due to the higher correlation in rout-
ing information, such as the connection between traffic
pattern and route change in on-demand routing, and the
source routes embedded in DSR. Therefore, when we de-
sign MANET protocol we should intentionally increase
such correlation to help IDS.
Nonetheless, there are serious limitations to the IDS-in-
MANET research in general. Intrusion detection heavily
relies on the understanding of applications and threat mod-
els. Unfortunately, this research community does not yet
know what constitute a “typical” application or scenario.
We have used a mobility and application scenario very sim-
ilar to what have been widely used in literature, such as
10 nodes moving in a random way-point pattern within a
1000 × 1000 space. This is artificial at best. IDS models
developed using such scenario will hardly have any effec-
tiveness in real life. So we believe the more pressing tasks
are for us to better understand the potential applications
for MANET, and to define realistic benchmarks. Without
these, it will be very difficult to develop IDS techniques for
use in MANET in the future.
Availability
Handling MAC Layer Misbehavior in Wireless Net-
works, Pradeep Kyasanur (UIUC) and Nitin H. Vaidya
(UIUC)
Introduction: Wireless MAC protocols such as IEEE
802.11 use cooperative contention resolution mechanisms
for sharing the channel. In this environment, some selfish
hosts in the network can misbehave by failing to adhere to
the network protocols with the intent of obtaining an un-
fair share of the channel bandwidth. Our work focuses on
detecting and handling MAC layer misbehavior by selfish
hosts in IEEE 802.11-based networks.
In IEEE 802.11 DCF mode, nodes exchange RTS and
CTS packets to reserve the channel before data transmis-
sion (When data packets are small RTS/CTS exchange may
be omitted.) A node with a packet to transmit picks a ran-
dom backoff value b chosen uniformly from range [0, CW ],
where CW is called the Contention Window, and transmits
after waiting for b idle slots. If a transmission results in a
collision, the CW value is doubled. The throughput ob-
tained by a node is inversely proportional to the average
time it waits in backing off. Therefore, misbehaving nodes
can obtain a higher share of throughput by selecting small
backoff values or by not doubling the CW value after a
collision.
Handling Misbehavior: Misbehaving hosts may obtain an
unfair share of channel bandwidth. Traffic analysis can be
used to identify such misbehaving hosts. IEEE 802.11 pro-
tocol is unfair in the short-term and thus the monitoring
interval should be sufficiently large for reasonably accu-
rate misbehavior detection. Consequently, short-term mis-
behavior may not be detected using traffic analysis. In ad-
dition, a misbehaving node may restrict itself to a fair share
of bandwidth and yet have low transmission delay by trans-
mitting its packets with small backoff values. Traffic analy-
sis may not detect such misbehavior. Game-theoretic tech-
niques have also been used to develop MAC layer protocols
that are resilient to misbehavior. However, these protocols
may result in poorer throughput in the absence of misbe-
havior.
An alternate approach that we adopt is to modify the
IEEE 802.11 protocol to simplify misbehavior detection
while retaining its performance and fairness characteristics.
We present a detection procedure [20] for a network having
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a well-behaved receiver and multiple potentially misbehav-
ing senders. An example of this is an infrastructure-based
network having a well-behaved base station (receiver) and
multiple mobile hosts (senders) communicating with the
base station. We use this example network to illustrate our
solution. However, our solution may be applied to ad hoc
networks as well.
Detection Procedure. The base station provides a back-
off value b to be used by a host for its (i + 1)th transmis-
sion to the base station in the CTS or ACK packet of the ith
transmission. In the event of a collision, the host generates
a new backoff value using a deterministic function f with
b as a parameter. The host includes the attempt number of
retransmission in every RTS or DATA packet. When the
base station receives a packet successfully, it computes the
expected number of slots the host should have waited us-
ing the transmission attempt number and the originally as-
signed backoff value as parameters to the function f . The
host is deemed to have deviated from the protocol if the
number of idle slots sensed by the base station between the
ith and (i+1)th from the host is lesser than a fraction α of
the expected number of slots. If K deviations are identified
in a window of THRESH packets from the node (α, K and
THRESH are protocol parameters), the host is designated
to be misbehaving.
Correcting Misbehavior. The benefits gained by misbe-
having nodes are increased throughput and decreased de-
lay. The correction mechanism aims to negate these ben-
efits without penalizing the conforming nodes. When the
monitoring procedure detects that a host has waited for less
than the expected backoff by an amount D, this amount
D is added as penalty to the next backoff assigned to that
node. In addition, a misbehaving node suffers fewer col-
lisions per successful transmission on an average and we
attempt to negate this benefit by adding additional penalty
to the next backoff value assigned to that node.
Conclusion and Future Work: In this work, we have de-
veloped modifications to IEEE 802.11 protocol for sim-
plified misbehavior detection in infrastructure-based net-
works. The approach may be used in ad hoc networks as
well. Each node in the ad hoc network can monitor the
traffic it receives to verify that the nodes sending the pack-
ets are well-behaved. We plan to augment our approach
with mechanisms to detect a misbehaving node that gains
more bandwidth by using multiple MAC addresses. We
also plan to develop protocols to handle misbehavior for
scenarios with misbehaving receivers, and scenarios with
colluding senders and receivers. We will also explore other
approaches for handling misbehavior.
Stimulating Cooperation of Selfish Nodes in MANET,
Pietro Michiardi (Inst. Eurecom) and Refik Molva (Inst.
Eurecom)
This paper focuses on a security issue specific to mobile
ad hoc networks: node selfishness. Unlike networks using
dedicated nodes to support basic functions like packet for-
warding, routing, and network management, in MANET
those functions are carried out by all available nodes. In
such networks there is no good reason to assume that a node
will cooperate and provide services to each other: service
provision consumes energy, a scarce resource that nodes
are induced to use for their own communications.
It is a realistic assumption that selfish nodes do not per-
form active attacks, due to the high energy consumption
thereof. In the proposed security scheme (CORE), node co-
operation is stimulated by a collaborative monitoring tech-
nique and a reputation mechanism. Each node of the net-
work monitors the behavior of its neighbors with respect to
a requested function and collects observations about the ex-
ecution of that function: as an example, when a node initi-
ates a Route Request (e.g., using the DSR routing protocol)
it monitors that its neighbors process the request, whether
with a Route Reply or by relaying the Route Request. If
the observed result and the expected result coincide, then
the observation will take a positive value, otherwise it will
take a negative value.
Based on the collected observations, each node com-
putes a reputation value for every neighbor. The formula
used to evaluate the reputation value avoids false detections
(caused for example by link breaks) by using an aging fac-
tor that gives more relevance to past observations: frequent
variations on a node behavior are filtered. Furthermore, if
the function that is being monitored provides an acknowl-
edgement message (e.g., the Route Reply message of the
DSR protocol), reputation information can also be gathered
about nodes that are not within the radio range of the mon-
itoring node. In this case, only positive ratings are assigned
to the nodes that participated to the execution of the func-
tion in its totality.
The CORE mechanism resists to attacks performed us-
ing the security mechanism itself: no negative ratings are
spread between the nodes, so that it is impossible for a
node to maliciously decrease another node’s reputation.
The reputation mechanism allows the nodes of the MANET
to gradually isolate selfish nodes: when the reputation as-
signed to a neighboring node decreases below a pre-defined
threshold, service provision to the misbehaving node will
be interrupted. Misbehaving nodes can, however, be re-
integrated in the network if they increase their reputation
by cooperating to the network operation.
An original approach to study the node selfishness prob-
lem in MANET is based on an economic model. In this
model, service provision preferences for each node are rep-
resented by a utility function. As the name implies, the util-
ity function quantifies the level of satisfaction a node gets
from using the network resources. Game-theoretic meth-
ods are applied to study cooperation under this new model.
Game theory is a powerful tool for modeling interactions
between self-interested users and predicting their choice of
strategy. Each player in the game maximizes some func-
tion of utility in a distributed fashion. The games settle at
a Nash equilibrium if one exists. Since nodes act selfishly,
the equilibrium point is not necessarily the best operating
point from a social point of view. Pricing emerges as an
effective tool for cooperation enforcement because of its
ability to guide node behavior toward a more efficient op-
erating point from the social point of view.
In our analysis we first identify the preference relations
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that are specific to our problem and then design a utility
function that satisfies this structure. The utility function we
used to model the selfishness problem takes into account
the energy that a node spends for the purpose of its own
communications and energy that the node has to use when
participating in the routing protocol and when relaying data
packets on behalf of other nodes. Node behavior is repre-
sented as the percentage of energy a node dedicates for its
own communications and the percentage of energy spent
for network operation (i.e., 50% means that the node uses
half of its energy for itself, half for routing and packet for-
warding). Simulations shows that under this definition, a
selfish node that tries to maximize its utility function will
dedicate the totality of its available energy for its own com-
munications. The CORE mechanism is then modeled as the
pricing function that is used to guide the operating point to
a fair position: reputation influences the percentage of en-
ergy a node is allowed to use for its own communications.
When the reputation rating is high, the amount of energy
the node can spend for its own use rises and vice versa.
Simulation results show a stable feedback system that con-
verges to an operating point where 48% of the available
energy is dedicated to the network operation (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Reputation and node behavior in time (Stimulat-
ing Cooperation of Selfish Nodes in MANET, P. Michiardi
and R. Molva)
Cooperation of Nodes, Sonja Buchegger (IBM Research,
Zu¨rich) and Jean-Yves Le Boudec (EPFL)
In game-theoretic terms, cooperation is a dilemma. The
dominating strategy for individual nodes is not to cooper-
ate, as cooperation consumes resources and it might result
in a disadvantage. But if every node follows that strategy,
the outcome is undesirable for everyone as it results in a
non functional or entirely absent network.
Learning by Observing – CONFIDANT: Our approach is to
find the selfish and/or malicious nodes and to isolate them,
so that misbehavior will not pay off but result in isolation
and thus cannot continue. CONFIDANT [4] is short for
‘Cooperation Of Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeT-
works’ and detects malicious nodes by means of observa-
tion or reports about several types of attacks, thus allow-
ing nodes to route around misbehaved nodes and to isolate
them. Figure 4 shows the CONFIDANT components as
extension to a routing protocol such as Dynamic Source
Routing (DSR).
Nodes have a monitor for observations, reputation
records for first-hand and trusted second-hand observations
about routing and forwarding behavior of other nodes, trust
records to control trust given to received warnings, and a
path manager to adapt their behavior according to reputa-
tion and to take action against malicious nodes. The term
reputation is used to evaluate routing and forwarding be-
havior according to the network protocol, whereas the term
trust is used to evaluate participation in the CONFIDANT
meta-protocol.
Figure 4: CONFIDANT Components in a Node (Coopera-
tion of nodes, S. Buchegger and J.-Y. Le Boudec)
The dynamic behavior of CONFIDANT is as follows.
Nodes monitor their neighbors and change the reputation
accordingly. If they have reason to believe that a node mis-
behaves, they can take action in terms of their own routing
and forwarding and they can decide to inform other nodes
by sending an ALARM message. When a node receives
such an ALARM either directly or by promiscuously lis-
tening to the network, it evaluates how trustworthy trust
the ALARM is based on the source of the ALARM and the
accumulated ALARM messages about the node in ques-
tion. It can then decide whether to take action against the
misbehaving node.
Simulations for “no forwarding” have shown that CON-
FIDANT can cope well, even if half of the network popu-
lation acts maliciously.
Robustness: Assuming that nodes employ the CONFI-
DANT protocol, malicious nodes can be detected and iso-
lated. However, we have to ensure the robustness of CON-
FIDANT itself, for example its robustness against wrong
observations, i.e., categorizing behavior as an attack when
it is not or vice versa, and its robustness against wrong ac-
cusations, i.e., maliciously excluding cooperative nodes by
spreading the rumor that they misbehave. To facilitate cat-
egorization and trust management, we use a Bayesian ap-
proach, in which the belief of a node about its environment
as captured in the reputation records is updated at each ob-
servation. The belief models of several nodes are then com-
pared, evaluating the compatibility and excluding outliers.
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This assumes that nodes that spreading wrong accusations
are not in the majority at any given time.
Conclusions: Our goals are to increase cooperation by
proactively giving selfish nodes an incentive to cooperate,
as well as reactively isolate selfish or malicious nodes such
that they cannot continue their misbehavior. To make co-
operation in mobile ad-hoc networks attractive we have to
make sure that selfish behavior, i.e., a behavior that max-
imizes the utility of a node, leads to an outcome that is
also beneficial for the network. In CONFIDANT this is
achieved by gradually isolating a node that has accumu-
lated a bad reputation, such that, —once detected— it can
no longer benefit from the network, so if a node wants to
remain in the network it has to cooperate. This effect is
also exploited to largely neutralize malicious nodes when
other nodes no longer route or forward with or for them, by
reducing their influence to the radius of one hop. We are
currently investigating how to use the trust administration
to provide incentives to cooperate also at the meta-level,
i.e., to participate in CONFIDANT.
Stimulating Cooperation by Means of Nuglets, Levente
Buttya´n (EPFL) and Jean-Pierre Hubaux (EPFL)
In civilian applications of ad hoc networks, where each
node is its own authority, nodes may selfishly deny coop-
eration in order to save their own resources (e.g., battery
power, memory, CPU cycles).
One approach to solving this problem would be to make
the nodes tamper resistant, so that their behavior cannot
be modified by their users. However, this approach does
not seem to be very realistic, since ensuring that the whole
device is tamper resistant may be very difficult, if not im-
possible. Therefore, we propose another approach that re-
quires only a tamper resistant hardware module (such as
the SIM card in GSM phones), called security module, in
each node. Under the assumption that the user can possi-
bly modify the behavior of the node, but never that of the
security module, our design ensures that tampering with
the node is not advantageous for the user, and therefore, it
should happen only rarely.
We focus on the stimulation of packet forwarding, which
is a fundamental networking function that the nodes should
perform. In a nutshell, we propose a protocol that requires
the node to pass each packet (generated as well as received
for forwarding) to its security module. The security mod-
ule maintains a counter, called nuglet counter. When the
node wants to send a packet as originator, the number n
of forwarding nodes that are needed to reach the destina-
tion is estimated, and the nuglet counter is decreased by
n. When the node forwards a packet, its nuglet counter is
increased by one. The value of the nuglet counter must re-
main positive, which means that if the node wants to send
its own packets, then it must forward packets for the benefit
of other nodes. The nuglet counter is protected from illegit-
imate manipulation by the tamper resistance of the security
module.
In order to study the behavior of the proposed protocol,
we conducted simulations written in plain C++ language.
In our simulations, each node generates packets with a con-
stant average rate. If an own packet cannot be sent (due to
the low value of the nuglet counter), then it is dropped. We
model selfishness of the nodes by the goal of minimizing
the number of own packets dropped, which is equivalent to
maximizing zo = outoino , where outo denotes the number of
own packets sent by the node and ino stands for the number
of own packets generated by the node during the simulation
time.
We studied the performance of the following three for-
warding rules:
• Rule 1: always forward
• Rule 2: if c ≤ C then forward else forward with prob-
ability C/c and drop with probability 1− C/c
• Rule 3: if c ≤ C then forward else drop
where c and C denote the current and the initial number of
nuglets at the node, respectively. Clearly, the most cooper-
ative rule is Rule 1; Rules 2 and 3 are less cooperative, in
this order.
We set 90% of the nodes to use a given rule (we call this
the majority rule), and the remaining 10% of the nodes to
use Rule 1 in a first set of simulations, Rule 2 in a second
set of simulations, and finally Rule 3 in a third set of simu-
lations. We observed the average value of zo that the 10%
deviating nodes could achieve in each case. The results are
shown in Table 2.
Average value of zo
Majority of the 10% deviating nodes
rule when they use:
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3
Rule 1 0.979 0.935 0.924
Rule 2 0.941 0.905 0.897
Rule 3 0.898 0.873 0.865
Table 2: Comparison of forwarding rules (Stimulating
cooperation by means of nuglets, L. Buttyan and J.-P.
Hubaux)
Remarkably, Rule 1 performed the best in every case.
This means that nodes drop the smallest portion of their
own packets when they use Rule 1, no matter whether the
majority of the nodes use Rule 1, Rule 2, or Rule 3. Fur-
thermore, this is true for every packet generation rate that
we have simulated. Therefore, we conclude that the pro-
posed mechanism indeed stimulates the nodes for packet
forwarding.
A full description of the proposed approach, its protec-
tion scheme, and the simulations can be found in [6].
Cryptographic protocols
Cryptography with Guardian Angels: Bringing Civi-
lization to Pirates, Gildas Avoine (EPFL) and Serge Vau-
denay (EPFL)
Abstract: In contrast with traditional cryptographic pro-
tocols in which parties can have access to common third
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parties, and where at least one of them is assumed to be
honest, we propose here a new model which is relevant
for networks of communication devices with security mod-
ules. We then focus on the problem of fair exchange in this
model. We propose a probabilistic protocol which provides
arbitrarily low unfairness (involving a complexity cost).
Pirates and Guardian Angels Model: In classical mobile
networks, the communication scheme is made of both de-
vices Pi and providers; the latter may have put security
modules Gi in their devices. Gi’s can only communicate
with their own Pi, and Pi’s can only communicate with
both their security module and their provider.
In future networks like self-organized mobile networks,
the communication chain looks as follows and providers
are no longer involved.
P1 ↔ P2 ↔ . . . ↔ Pn−1 ↔ Pn
l l l l
G1 G2 Gn−1 Gn
Here we may assume that all users try to optimize their
benefit and are potential pirates, and thus security modules
serve as Guardian Angels in order to enforce community
rules. Since users can modify the behavior of their devices,
we can consider a user and a device as a same entity, a
Pirate.
For practical considerations, we assume that guardians
are tamper-resistant, simple and limited devices, and that
they can only communicate with their own device P . Smart
cards are examples of guardian angels. Guardians are set
up by a given provider who may define his own community
bylaw. This setting may lead to some interesting business
models.
In this model, confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity
are addressed in a classical way. A specific problem is the
insurance of receipt: how to certify that a message was well
transmitted and received? Here we address this problem in
context of fair exchange problem.
Fair Exchange Protocol: The proposed protocol is a proba-
bilistic fair exchange protocol between two entities Pi and
Pi+1 without trusted third party, which is in this way partic-
ularly relevant for self-organized networks. We recall first
that an exchange protocol is fair if, at the end of the execu-
tion, either both parties have received the expected value vi
and vi+1, or none of them have received any information
about the other value.
In the pirates and angels model, we assume that Gi’s
have a virtual private network (VPN) which protects confi-
dentiality, integrity, authentication, and sequentiality of the
exchanged messages. So, the only possible attack consists
in aborting the protocol. During a first stage, Gi and Gi+1
use this VPN in order to exchange the expected values vi
and vi+1.
The remaining stage is a simple synchronization prob-
lem: Gi andGi+1 need to decide in a synchronous way that
the exchange succeeded in order to disclose the exchanged
value to their devices. In this synchronization protocol, the
guardians, in turn, send a message through the VPN. This
message can be a termination signal or some dummy ran-
dom value. To do this, they flip a coin with probability p to
issue a termination signal. The pirates Pi and Pi+1 are as-
sumed to be unable to distinguish the signal from a random
value. Then, guardians consider that the protocol succeeds
when they have both received and sent the termination sig-
nal. Since pirates are assumed to get no information in the
messages, they cannot decide to stop depending on the pro-
tocol view. Hence they must decide to stop at some level
no matter what the communication are.
An analysis of our synchronization protocol yields to the
following theorems:
Theorem 1: Let C be the number of messages exchanged
between Gi and Gi+1. If p is the termination probability,
we have E(C) = 3p − 1 when Pi and Pi+1 are honest.
Theorem 2 : If p is the termination probability and pa the
highest probability of unfairness over all possible misbe-
havior of pirates, we have p4 ≤ pa ≤ p4(1−p) .
The proofs of these theorems are available in the ex-
tended abstract, as well as variants and extensions.
Rational Exchange, Levente Buttya´n (EPFL) and Jean-
Pierre Hubaux (EPFL)
There are many applications where two parties have to ex-
change digital items via a network. Clearly, each party
would like to have some guarantee that the other party
will not bring her in a disadvantageous situation by mis-
behaving in the exchange. The usual solution to this prob-
lem is to use a fair exchange protocol, which ensures for
a correctly behaving party that it cannot suffer any disad-
vantages. However, fair exchange is impossible without a
trusted third party, and therefore, its implementation can be
problematic in infrastructureless ad hoc networks.
A promising approach to solve the exchange problem in
ad hoc networks is based on the concept of rational ex-
change. A rational exchange protocol ensures that a mis-
behaving party cannot gain anything with the misbehavior.
Therefore, rational (self-interested) parties have no reason
to misbehave. However, unlike in fair exchange, a correctly
behaving party may suffer a disadvantage. While rational
exchange seems to provide weaker guarantees than fair ex-
change does, it has an appealing feature: under certain as-
sumptions, rational exchange is possible without a trusted
third party.
In order to be able to design rational exchange proto-
cols, one needs to have a fairly good understanding of the
concept. However, currently, rational exchange is not well
understood, and often confused with fair exchange. Our
goal is, therefore, to clarify this situation. In order to do so,
we propose a formal model of exchange protocols, which is
based on game theory [5]. We model the situation in which
parties of a given exchange protocol find themselves as a
game. We call this game the protocol game. The protocol
game encodes all the possible interactions of the protocol
parties. The protocol parties are modeled as players. The
protocol itself (as a set of rules) is represented as a set of
strategies (one strategy for each protocol party). Misbe-
havior means that a protocol party follows a strategy that is
different from its prescribed strategy.
We define the concept of rational exchange in terms of
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properties of the protocol game and the prescribed strate-
gies of the protocol parties. More precisely, we have been
inspired by the striking similarity between the informal def-
inition of rational exchange and the concept of Nash equi-
librium in games. Therefore, we define rational exchange
formally in terms of a Nash equilibrium in the protocol
game:
Definition: Let us consider a two-party exchange protocol
pi = {pi1, pi2}, where pi1 and pi2 are the programs for the
protocol parties. Furthermore, let us consider the protocol
game Gpi of pi, and let us denote the strategy of player pk
that represents pik within Gpi by s∗pk , k ∈ {1, 2}. pi is said
to be rational iff
• (s∗p1 , s∗p2) is a Nash equilibrium in the protocol game
Gpi; and
• both p1 and p2 prefer the outcome of (s∗p1 , s∗p2) to the
outcome of any other Nash equilibrium in Gpi .
Our model is sufficiently rich to permit the definition
of other properties of exchange protocols as well. More
specifically, we can also define fairness. Representing the
concepts of rational exchange and fair exchange in the
same model allows us to study their relationships. In par-
ticular, we prove that fairness implies rationality (assuming
that the protocol satisfies certain additional requirements):
Theorem: If the protocol satisfies the effectiveness, gain
closed, and safe back out properties, then fairness implies
rationality.
It is easy to see that the reverse is not true in general. Thus,
the result that we obtain from the model justifies the intu-
ition that fairness is a stronger requirement than rationality.
Besides leading to a deeper understanding of the concept
of rational exchange and its relationship to fair exchange,
our formalism can also be used to formally verify existing
rational exchange protocols. We illustrate this by analyz-
ing a rational exchange protocol proposed in the literature
by Syverson [7]. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that
Syverson’s protocol is rational only under the assumption
that the network is reliable, which means that it delivers
messages within a constant time interval; if this assump-
tion is removed, then the rationality property is lost.
This work is relevant in the context of ad hoc network-
ing as rational exchange might be the only viable solu-
tion to the exchange problem if the network is fully self-
organizing. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
who formalized the concept of rational exchange in its full
generality, studied its relation to fair exchange, and pro-
vided rigorous proofs of rationality for existing rational ex-
change protocols. Perhaps, the most original contribution
of this work is the usage of game theory as a tool for mod-
eling and analyzing security protocols. It shows that game
theory can successfully be used for such a task. In fact,
we believe that it is the most appropriate tool for modeling
rational exchange in particular.
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